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PROSECUTING DARK NET DRUG 
MARKETPLACE OPERATORS UNDER THE 
FEDERAL CRACK HOUSE STATUTE 
Thomas J. Nugent* 
 
Over 70,000 Americans died as the result of a drug overdose in 2017, a 
record year following a record year.  Amidst this crisis, the popularity of 
drug marketplaces on what has been called the “dark net” has exploded.  
Illicit substances are sold freely on such marketplaces, and the anonymity 
these marketplaces provide has proved troublesome for law enforcement.  
Law enforcement has responded by taking down several of these 
marketplaces and prosecuting their creators, such as Ross Ulbricht of the 
former Silk Road.  Prosecutors have typically leveled conspiracy charges 
against the operators of these marketplaces—in Ulbricht’s case, alleging a 
single drug conspiracy comprising Ulbricht and the thousands of vendors on 
the Silk Road.  This Note argues that the conspiracy to distribute narcotics 
charge is a poor conceptual fit for the behavior of operators of typical dark 
net drug marketplaces, and that the federal “crack house” statute provides 
a better charge.  Though charging these operators under the crack house 
statute would be a novel approach, justice is best served when the crime 
accurately describes the behavior, as the crack house statute does in 
proscribing what dark net drug marketplace operators like Ulbricht do. 
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INTRODUCTION 
America is in the midst of an opioid epidemic.  In 2016, approximately 
64,000 people in the United States died of a drug overdose, up roughly 22 
percent from the year before.1  Of these deaths, 20,100 involved fentanyl and 
fentanyl analogs; 15,400 involved heroin; 14,400 involved prescription 
opioids; 10,600 involved cocaine; and 7,660 involved methamphetamine.2  
Overdose deaths rose to over 70,000 in 2017,3 and provisional data suggest 
that the number slightly shrunk to over 69,000 in 2018.4 
Concurrently, technological advances have enabled online drug 
marketplaces like Silk Road, Silk Road 2.0, AlphaBay, and Hansa, where 
 
 1. Josh Katz, The First Count of Fentanyl Deaths in 2016:  Up 540% in Three Years, 
N.Y. TIMES:  UPSHOT (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/02/ 
upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/4T74-7MTK]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Josh Katz & Margot Sanger-Katz, ‘The Numbers Are So Staggering.’  Overdose 
Deaths Set a Record Last Year, N.Y. TIMES:  UPSHOT (Nov. 29, 2018), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/29/upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-deaths.html 
[https://perma.cc/M78X-WA6E]. 
 4. Jon Kamp, Overdose Deaths Likely to Fall for First Time Since 1990, WALL ST. J. 
(June 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/overdose-deaths-likely-to-fall-for-first-time-
since-1990-11561541406 [https://perma.cc/AY42-EHSX]. 
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drugs are widely available.5  These marketplaces, located on the “dark net,”6 
a subset of websites that exist on an encrypted network, offer buyers and 
sellers a near-anonymous transactional space.7  Law enforcement, given 
limited resources, has an incentive to shut down these marketplaces rather 
than prosecute individual users.  Recently, one of the tools law enforcement 
has used to take down dark net drug marketplaces is the “conspiracy to 
distribute narcotics” charge.8 
While prosecutions of dark net marketplace operators with narcotics 
conspiracy charges have yielded success,9 this Note will argue that the 
conspiracy to distribute narcotics charge typically will be a poor conceptual 
fit for prosecuting dark net drug marketplace operators.  Criminal justice is 
best carried out when the crime charged accurately tracks the criminal 
behavior engaged in.  The further the charge is from the behavior, the less 
justifiable a conviction, while the closer the charge to the behavior, the more 
justifiable a conviction.  Typical dark net marketplace structures tend not to 
resemble conspiracies between the operator and the users, so while such 
 
 5. See, e.g., Nicolas Christin, Traveling the Silk Road:  A Measurement Analysis of a 
Large Anonymous Online Marketplace, 22D INT’L WORLD WIDE WEB CONF. 222 (May 2013), 
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2488408 [https://perma.cc/3GT5-AJS8] (“We were able to 
determine that Silk Road indeed mostly caters drugs . . . .”); Nathaniel Popper, Opioid Dealers 
Embrace the Dark Web to Send Deadly Drugs by Mail, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALBOOK (June 10, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/10/business/dealbook/opioid-dark-web-drug-
overdose.html [https://perma.cc/UPJ7-9T2M]; Kyle Soska & Nicolas Christin, Measuring the 
Longitudinal Evolution of the Online Anonymous Marketplace Ecosystem, 24TH USENIX 
CONF. ON SECURITY SYMP. 40–42 (Aug. 2015), https://www.usenix.org/system/ 
files/conference/usenixsecurity15/sec15-paper-soska-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVW6-
W44W] (highlighting the lifespan of select marketplaces and product types). 
 6. This Note will use the term “dark net” to refer to the place where these marketplaces 
are found, but many media outlets often refer to the same place as the “dark web.” 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685, 687 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The dark web 
is a collection of encrypted networks providing strong privacy protections to its users.”); Di 
Ma & Gregory D. Kaufmann, War on Drugs 2.1:  Setting the Terms of Engagement, 28 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 94, 95–96 (2017) (“The Dark Web comprises of anonymously hosted web 
pages that are only accessible through software that masks user IP addresses, such as The 
Onion Router . . . .  The main benefit of the Dark Web is anonymity.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Operator of Silk Road 2.0 
Website Charged in Manhattan Federal Court (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/contact-
us/field-offices/newyork/news/press-releases/operator-of-silk-road-2.0-website-charged-in-
manhattan-federal-court [https://perma.cc/2SA4-8F74] [hereinafter November 2014 Press 
Release]; Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Ross Ulbricht, aka Dread Pirate 
Roberts, Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to Life in Prison (May 29, 2015), 
https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/newyork/news/press-releases/ross-ulbricht-aka-
dread-pirate-roberts-sentenced-in-manhattan-federal-court-to-life-in-prison [https://perma.cc/ 
XG56-AS7C] [hereinafter May 2015 Press Release]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
AlphaBay, the Largest Online ‘Dark Market,’ Shut Down (July 20, 2017), https:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alphabay-largest-online-dark-market-shut-down [https://perma.cc/ 
43H4-Z9J9]. 
 9. See, e.g., Joseph Cox, Silk Road 2.0 Right-Hand Man Pleads Guilty, VICE:  
MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 22, 2016, 11:40 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/jpg59g/silk-
road-20-right-hand-man-pleads-guilty [https://perma.cc/75UD-NU7N]; Sam Thielman, Silk 
Road Operator Ross Ulbricht Sentenced to Life in Prison, GUARDIAN (May 29, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/29/silk-road-ross-ulbricht-sentenced 
[https://perma.cc/2ZJU-WJMY]. 
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operators should be held accountable for their actions, doing so through the 
conspiracy charge poses serious concerns for justice. 
Instead, what is needed is a statute that prohibits exactly the type of 
behavior the typical dark net drug marketplace operator engages in—
maintaining a place for the purpose of the distribution of drugs.  Fortunately, 
such a statute already exists—the federal “crack house” statute.10  Though 
prosecuting dark net drug marketplace operators with the crack house statute 
is a novel approach entailing its own set of challenges, charging a narcotics 
conspiracy where none exists threatens prosecutorial legitimacy. 
Part I of this Note will review the opioid crisis and the widespread 
availability of illicit drugs through new dark net marketplaces; discuss the 
elements of the conspiracy to distribute narcotics charge; briefly review the 
prosecution of Ross Ulbricht, the operator of the Silk Road drug marketplace; 
and then end by taking a closer look at 21 U.S.C. § 856, the crack house 
statute.  Part II will define the typical dark net drug marketplace before asking 
whether conspiracy law might be a poor conceptual fit for prosecuting the 
operator of such a marketplace, using the Ulbricht prosecution as a helpful 
example.  Part III will argue that a better charge than conspiracy to distribute 
narcotics is needed to prosecute the operator of the typical dark net drug 
marketplace, that the ongoing opioid crisis demands a prosecutorial tool in 
the absence of the conspiracy charge, and that the crack house charge is a 
better fit than conspiracy law when applied to the typical operator case. 
I.  THE OPIOID CRISIS, THE DARK NET, AND MODERN DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
Overdose deaths in America have rapidly increased over the past several 
years.11  Fatal overdose data for 2017, and initial data for 2018, suggest that 
the crisis is nearing or has reached an apex.12  At the same time, drug 
marketplaces on the dark net have grown in scope and revenue.13  U.S. 
prosecutors have responded by pursuing the operators of these marketplaces 
in a variety of ways, often by bringing the charge of conspiracy to distribute 
 
 10. 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012). 
 11. Katz, supra note 1. 
 12. See Christopher Ingraham, Fentanyl Use Drove Drug Overdose Deaths to a Record 
High in 2017, CDC Estimates, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2018), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/08/15/fentanyl-use-drove-drug-overdose-deaths-
record-high-cdc-estimates/ [https://perma.cc/LZX2-VBGQ]; Kamp, supra note 4; German 
Lopez, 2017 Was the Worst Year Ever for Drug Overdose Deaths in America, VOX (Aug. 16, 
2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/8/16/17698204/ 
opioid-epidemic-overdose-deaths-2017 [https://perma.cc/5DVY-SX4P]; see also Katz & 
Sanger-Katz, supra note 3. 
 13. KRISTY KRUITHOF ET AL., RAND EUR., INTERNET-FACILITATED DRUGS TRADE:  AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE SIZE, SCOPE AND THE ROLE OF THE NETHERLANDS 61 (2016), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1600/RR1607/RAND_RR
1607.pdf [https://perma.cc/VNL2-2UQD] (finding, as of 2016, “evidence of a substantial 
growth in cryptomarkets since the closure of the first major drug cryptomarket, Silk Road 1.0, 
in September 2013” and that “listings for drugs has seen a nearly six-fold increase; the 
numbers of vendors and transactions have nearly tripled; and revenue (aka ‘turnover’) has 
doubled over the period”). 
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narcotics.14  For example, Ross Ulbricht, creator and operator of the Silk 
Road dark net drug marketplace, was charged with and eventually convicted 
of conspiracy to distribute narcotics—the prosecution alleging a single, all-
encompassing conspiracy between him and each of the sellers of the 
marketplace.15  While prosecutors were successful in bringing the conspiracy 
to distribute narcotics charge, among others,16 they failed to bring a charge 
under the crack house statute, 21 U.S.C. § 856, which makes it a federal 
crime to “knowingly . . . maintain any place, whether permanently or 
temporarily, for the purpose of . . . distributing . . . any controlled 
substance.”17  This Part will review the landscape of the opioid crisis, the 
dark net, the elements of conspiracy to distribute narcotics, the Ulbricht 
prosecution, and the history and current use of the crack house statute. 
A.  The Opioid Crisis and Dark Net Drug Marketplaces 
Overdose deaths in America have reached crisis levels.  Beginning in 
1999, deaths from opioid pain relievers have risen steadily year after year18 
and have increased in 2017.19  The economic cost of the crisis is staggering—
the Council of Economic Advisers for the White House estimated the cost of 
the crisis at just over $500 billion in 2015 alone, a year when 33,000 
Americans died of overdoses.20  The U.S. Congress,21 the Office of the 
 
 14. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 15. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment 
at 9, United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14-cr-68 (KBF)), 
2014 WL 7151214 (“Count One charges that he conspired with others to distribute drugs, a 
charge that readily encompasses Ulbricht’s operation of the Silk Road website.  In that role, 
Ulbricht entered into a joint venture with thousands of drug dealers around the world to 
distribute drugs online.”). 
 16. Benjamin Weiser, Man Behind Silk Road Website Is Convicted on All Counts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/nyregion/man-behind-silk-road-
website-is-convicted-on-all-counts.html [https://perma.cc/5H46-BT8W]. 
 17. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2012). 
 18. Andrew Kolodny et al., The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis:  A Public Health 
Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 560 (2015) (“Over 
the past 15 years, the rate of opioid pain reliever (OPR) use in the United States has soared.  
From 1999 to 2011, consumption of hydrocodone more than doubled and consumption of 
oxycodone increased by nearly 500%.  During the same time frame, the OPR-related overdose 
death rate nearly quadrupled.”). 
 19. See Lopez, supra note 12. 
 20. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE UNDERESTIMATED 
COST OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 1 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/ 
files/images/The%20Underestimated%20Cost%20of%20the%20Opioid%20Crisis.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6U9C-VQCX]. 
 21. Colby Itkowitz, Senate Passes Sweeping Opioids Package, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/17/senate-set-pass-sweeping-
opioids-package/ [https://perma.cc/FDT7-D26S].  This package was ultimately enacted into 
law as the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, 132 Stat. 3894 
(2018). 
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President,22 and individual states and state agencies have responded to the 
crisis.23 
As the opioid epidemic has accelerated, new technologies have helped to 
create a variety of online dark net drug marketplaces.  The dark net refers to 
a subset of the internet characterized in large part by anonymity—dark net 
spaces are primarily inaccessible to regular internet browsers, instead 
requiring software like The Onion Router (Tor) to mask users’ Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses and identities.24  Networks allowing totally 
anonymous and encrypted communications create difficulties for law 
enforcement and opportunities for criminals.25  Typical dark net 
marketplaces, like the Silk Road, Evolution, and AlphaBay, host primarily 
drug transactions.26 
U.S. prosecutors have successfully taken down several of these drug 
marketplaces by targeting their operators.27  In each of these takedowns, 
 
 22. President Donald J. Trump’s Initiative to Stop Opioid Abuse and Reduce Drug Supply 
and Demand, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/president-donald-j-trumps-initiative-stop-opioid-abuse-reduce-drug-supply-
demand/ [https://perma.cc/STX3-YHG9]. 
 23. See, e.g., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 2018 WASHINGTON STATE OPIOID 
RESPONSE PLAN (2018), https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/1000/140-182-
StateOpioidResponsePlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JAX-79GK]; Addressing the Opioid 
Epidemic in New York State, N.Y. ST.:  DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.health.ny.gov/ 
community/opioid_epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/UU7P-5FJS] (last updated Mar. 2018); 
Treating Heroin and Opioid Use Disorder, COMMONWEALTH OF PA., https:// 
www.pa.gov/guides/opioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/S7ZS-YGXC] (last visited Aug. 22, 
2019). 
 24. See Ma & Kaufmann, supra note 7, at 95; Jessica A. Wood, The Darknet:  A Digital 
Copyright Revolution, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, 30–33 (2010); Amanda Haasz, Note, 
Underneath It All:  Policing International Child Pornography on the Dark Web, 43 SYRACUSE 
J. INT’L L. & COM. 353, 354–58 (2016); A. Dominick Romeo, Comment, Hidden Threat:  The 
Dark Web Surrounding Cyber Security, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 73, 74–77 (2016). 
 25. See generally Going Dark:  Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between Public 
Safety and Privacy:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (joint 
statement of James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Sally Yates, 
Deputy Att’y Gen., Department of Justice) (explaining the obstacles posed to law 
enforcement); Kaleigh E. Aucoin, Note, The Spider’s Parlor:  Government Malware on the 
Dark Web, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1438–41 (2018). 
 26. See, e.g., Julian Broséus et al., A Geographical Analysis of Trafficking on a Popular 
Darknet Market, 277 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 88, 92–96 (2017) (discussing Evolution sales); 
Nicolas Christin, An EU-Focused Analysis of Drug Supply on the AlphaBay Marketplace, 
EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION 12–13 (2017), http:// 
www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/attachments/6622/AlphaBay-final-paper.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/M54P-YRQ6] (discussing AlphaBay transactions); Christin, supra note 5, at 7–9 
(discussing Silk Road sales). 
 27. Andy Greenberg, End of the Silk Road:  FBI Says It’s Busted the Web’s Biggest 
Anonymous Drug Black Market, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/andygreenberg/2013/10/02/end-of-the-silk-road-fbi-busts-the-webs-biggest-
anonymous-drug-black-market [https://perma.cc/2JAU-6E8S]; Donna Leinwand Leger, Feds 
Shut Down Silk Road 2.0, Arrest San Francisco Man, USA TODAY (Nov. 6, 2014, 4:04 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/06/feds-shut-down-silk-road-
copycat/18591155/ [https://perma.cc/56C5-KLXL]; Nathaniel Popper & Rebecca R. Ruiz, 2 
Leading Online Black Markets Are Shut Down by Authorities, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALBOOK (July 
20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/dealbook/alphabay-dark-web-
opioids.html [https://perma.cc/9T3Z-JL89]. 
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prosecutors leveled a charge of conspiracy to distribute narcotics at the 
operators, among others.28 
B.  Conspiracy Law 
It is a federal crime to “knowingly or intentionally . . . distribute . . . a 
controlled substance.”29  Under 21 U.S.C. § 846, it is also a federal crime to 
conspire to do so.30  The crime of conspiracy exists as a separate offense 
primarily to guard against the danger of concerted action—the theory being 
that individuals working together to achieve criminal goals are capable of 
more harm than they would be on their own.31  Conspiracy typically has four 
elements:  first, an agreement between two or more parties; second, that the 
agreement be to achieve an illegal goal; third, that the parties have knowledge 
of and participate in the conspiracy; and fourth, at least one party committed 
at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.32 
What constitutes an agreement differs between courts—an explicit 
agreement will suffice, but so too might a willingness to work together, 
mutual promises, or a meeting of the minds.33  What is clear about the 
agreement element is that, due to the often-secretive nature of conspiracies, 
a formal agreement is not necessary—jurors may infer that an agreement 
exists even when it is implicit.34 
The illegal goal element means that the government must establish that the 
purpose of the conspiracy was to either defraud the United States or violate 
a federal law.35  21 U.S.C. § 846 requires that the conspiracy’s goal be to 
violate any offense listed within § 846, including its prohibitions on drug 
possession and distribution.36 
 
 28. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  This Note primarily focuses on the Silk 
Road prosecution because it was the only dark net drug marketplace enforcement taken all the 
way through trial. 
 29. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). 
 30. Id. § 846. 
 31. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593–94 (1961) (noting that 
“[c]oncerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully 
attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path 
of criminality” and that “[g]roup association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, 
makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one criminal could 
accomplish”). 
 32. Damon Porter, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1307, 1310–14 
(2017).  However, drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 does not require the showing of an 
overt act. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11 (1994). 
 33. Laurent Sacharoff, Conspiracy as Contract, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 414–24 
(2016). 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 457 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a 
formal agreement unnecessary in a RICO conspiracy because “[a] defendant’s agreement to 
participate in the RICO conspiracy may be inferred from his acts”); United States v. 
Mickelson, 378 F.3d 810, 821 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Because the details of a conspiracy often are 
shrouded in secrecy, circumstantial evidence and inferences from the parties’ actions may be 
used to establish the conspiracy’s existence.”). 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
 36. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). 
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The knowledge element requires evidence that the defendant had the 
specific intent to engage in the behavior that constituted the criminal object.37  
Though knowledge may be shown with circumstantial evidence,38 without 
proof of voluntary participation by the defendant, the conspiracy charge will 
necessarily fail.39 
Conspiracy law offers prosecutors several advantages.  Wayne LeFave, a 
leading scholar on criminal substantive law and procedure, identified five 
distinct benefits:  (1) the inherent vagueness in the crime of conspiracy 
itself;40 (2) that the trial venue may be proper in any jurisdiction in which an 
overt act took place;41 (3) the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule;42 
(4) the wide latitude afforded prosecutors in admitting circumstantial 
evidence;43 and (5) the joint trial.44 
Yet courts and scholars alike have criticized these advantages as unfair.  In 
particular, while the inherent vagueness of the crime allows prosecutors to 
attack what may be truly secretive and kaleidoscopic conspiracy structures, 
that same vagueness is often maligned.45  Another concern of scholars is the 
shifting nature of the agreement element,46 which has important implications 
 
 37. See, e.g., United States v. Hassan, 578 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (“A conspiracy 
conviction cannot be sustained unless the government established beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant had the specific intent to violate the substantive statute.”); United States v. 
Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Conspiracy is a specific intent crime . . . .  ‘Proof 
that the defendant knew that some crime would be committed is not enough.’” (quoting United 
States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2002))). 
 38. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Gardner, 
488 F.3d 700, 711 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 908 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 39. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940) (“The gist of the offense of 
conspiracy . . . is agreement among the conspirators to commit an offense attended by an act 
of one or more of the conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy . . . .  Those having no 
knowledge of the conspiracy are not conspirators . . . .”); United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 
613, 618 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Government must prove the defendants knew of the 
conspiracy’s unlawful objective . . . .”); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1294 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (“The knowledge requirement is satisfied when the Government shows a 
defendant’s awareness of the essential nature of the conspiracy.”). 
 40. 2 WAYNE R. LEFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 12.1(b)(1) (3d ed. 2018). 
 41. Id. § 12.1(b)(2). 
 42. Id. § 12.1(b)(3). 
 43. Id. § 12.1(b)(4). 
 44. Id. § 12.1(b)(5). 
 45. See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445–46 (1949) (criticizing the 
conspiracy crime as an “elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense,” and stating, “[t]he modern 
crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition”); Albert J. Harno, Intent in 
Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 624 (1941) (“In the long category of crimes there 
is none, not excepting criminal attempt, more difficult to confine within the boundaries of 
definitive statement than conspiracy.”); Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. 
REV. 393, 393 (1922) (“A doctrine so vague in its outlines and uncertain in its fundamental 
nature as criminal conspiracy lends no strength or glory to the law; it is a veritable quicksand 
of shifting opinion and ill-considered thought.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Several Problems in Criminal Conspiracy Laws 
and Some Proposals for Reform, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 427, 441 (2007) (“Courts have further 
expanded the crime of conspiracy by reifying the conspiratorial agreement, treating it as if it 
were something more than the mere agreement between or among people or entities . . . .  The 
language used evokes a metaphor . . . .  [I]f a jury is directed in a way that encourages it to use 
the metaphor, then the defendant may be prejudiced.”); Sacharoff, supra note 33, at 414 (“In 
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in the context of alleged agreements between dark net drug marketplace 
operators and their users.47  Scholars have also criticized the hearsay 
exception for coconspirator statements on various grounds,48 as well as the 
broad venue provision for conspiracy cases,49 but these concerns will not be 
addressed in this Note. 
C.  The Ross Ulbricht Prosecution 
The Silk Road was an online drug marketplace located on the dark net that 
linked buyers and sellers.50  Started in 2011, the Silk Road rapidly expanded 
as a marketplace until 2013.51  Users could list or purchase a variety of items 
on the Silk Road, but the most common items transacted for were drugs, 
including marijuana, prescription pills, cocaine, ecstasy, heroin, and other 
controlled substances.52  One defining feature of the Silk Road was the strong 
anonymity it offered users.  Accessible only through the Tor browser, and 
through the use of Bitcoin as an electronic payment system, the Silk Road 
allowed users to transact mostly free of anchors to their true identities, such 
as IP addresses or bank records.53  As of July 2013, there were allegedly 
957,079 registered user accounts on the Silk Road.54  Between February 2011 
and July 2013, over 1.2 million transactions allegedly took place on the 
website.55  Revenue for sales totaled roughly 600,000 bitcoins, for the 2013 
equivalent of roughly $1.2 billion, and the Silk Road earned the equivalent 
of roughly $79.8 million in commissions.56 
The Silk Road was shut down by U.S. law enforcement in 2013, and its 
creator, Ross Ulbricht, was arrested.57  After a jury trial, Ulbricht was 
convicted in 2015 on all seven counts he faced:  distributing narcotics; 
distributing narcotics by means of the internet; conspiring to distribute 
 
assessing how legislatures or courts define ‘agreement’ in conspiracy, we run headlong into a 
threshold problem:  they don’t.”). 
 47. See infra Part II.A. 
 48. See, e.g., Ben Trachtenberg, Coconspirators, “Coventurers,” and the Exception 
Swallowing the Hearsay Rule, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 581, 637–48 (2009); Patrick J. Sullivan, Note, 
Bootstrapping of Hearsay Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E):  Further Erosion of 
the Coconspirator Exemption, 74 IOWA L. REV. 467, 469–70 (1989). 
 49. See, e.g., Robert L. Ullmann, One Hundred Years After Hyde:  Time to Expand Venue 
Safeguards in Federal Criminal Conspiracy Cases?, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1003, 1024–
28 (2012). 
 50. See Alice Huang, Note, Reaching Within Silk Road:  The Need for a New Subpoena 
Power That Targets Illegal Bitcoin Transactions, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2093, 2104 (2015). 
 51. Carmine DePiero, Note, Deciphering Cryptocurrency:  Shining a Light on the Deep 
Dark Web, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1267, 1274–75. 
 52. Christin, supra note 5, at 8–9. 
 53. Soska & Christin, supra note 5, at 33. 
 54. Sealed Complaint at 14, United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(No. 14-cr-68 (KBF)) [hereinafter Ulbricht Complaint]. 
 55. Id. at 15.  At trial, the government provided evidence showing that the Silk Road 
generated revenues of more than $213 million. See Weiser, supra note 16. 
 56. Ulbricht Complaint, supra note 54, at 15. 
 57. James Ball et al., FBI Claims Largest Bitcoin Seizure After Arrest of Alleged Silk Road 
Founder, GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/oct/02/ 
alleged-silk-road-website-founder-arrested-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/HAS4-PB29]. 
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narcotics; engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise; conspiring to commit 
computer hacking; conspiring to traffic in false identity documents; and 
conspiring to commit money laundering.58  He was sentenced to life in prison 
in 2015.59  This Note only focuses on one charge the prosecution brought—
conspiracy to distribute narcotics60—and one that it did not—maintaining a 
place for the purpose of the distribution of drugs under the crack house 
statute.61  This Note will argue that the former fails to accurately describe the 
behavior engaged in and the latter describes it nearly perfectly. 
The government’s theory behind the narcotics conspiracy charge was that 
Ulbricht entered into a joint agreement with thousands of drug dealers around 
the world—the sellers on the Silk Road—to distribute drugs online.62  In 
furtherance of this conspiracy, he created and maintained the Silk Road to 
facilitate drug deals and evade law enforcement.63  In return, he would earn 
a commission on every transaction.64  The elements of the conspiracy, thus, 
were as follows:  first, the “agreement,” made between Ulbricht and each 
other seller on the Silk Road, was to distribute drugs; second, the “criminal 
object” of the conspiracy was to violate federal narcotics law;65 and third, 
Ulbricht had knowledge of this conspiracy involving him and the sellers on 
the Silk Road, and the sellers had knowledge of this conspiracy between 
Ulbricht and themselves. 
Before trial, the court denied Ulbricht’s motion to dismiss the indictment, 
including the narcotics conspiracy count.66  In doing so, the court carefully 
considered the intricacies of the alleged conspiracy before deciding that the 
indictment sufficiently alleged a narcotics conspiracy.67  Because the court’s 
breakdown of conspiracy law in the context of Ulbricht’s creation of the Silk 
Road is illuminating, its discussion will be briefly reviewed. 
First, the court asked whether there could be a legally cognizable 
agreement between Ulbricht and each of the users of the site to engage in 
narcotics trafficking, and if so, what the difference was between Ulbricht’s 
conduct and the conduct of a person who designed a legitimate online 
marketplace like, for example, eBay.68  It answered yes and determined that 
the intent of the creator distinguishes the two.69  The court stated that what 
was alleged in the indictment was that Ulbricht “purposefully and 
intentionally designed, created, and operated Silk Road to facilitate unlawful 
 
 58. May 2015 Press Release, supra note 8. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Superseding Indictment at 4–7, United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14-cr-68 (KBF)). 
 61. 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012). 
 62. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, 
supra note 15, at 9. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 21 U.S.C. § 846. 
 66. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 570. 
 67. Id. at 562. 
 68. Id. at 555. 
 69. Id. at 555–57. 
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transactions.”70  Ensuing sales on the site could then amount to circumstantial 
evidence of a conspiracy, as could evidence of facts alleged in the indictment, 
including that Ulbricht benefitted monetarily from the site and that he used 
violence to protect the site and its proceeds.71  In distinguishing the Silk Road 
from a legitimate marketplace, the court held, “Ulbricht is alleged to have 
knowingly and intentionally constructed and operated an expansive black 
market for selling and purchasing narcotics . . . .  This separates Ulbricht’s 
conduct from the mass of others whose websites may—without their 
planning or expectation—be used for unlawful purposes.”72 
Second, the court asked who the alleged coconspirators could be, and what 
form the alleged conspiracy could take.73  It pointed to the indictment, which 
alleged a single conspiracy consisting of “several thousand drug dealers and 
other unlawful vendors,” and then discussed two typical conspiracy 
structures:  the “chain” conspiracy and the “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy.74  
The court stated that “the form of the conspiracy is not as important as a 
determination that at least one other person joined in the alleged 
conspiratorial agreement with Ulbricht” and that, while complex, the 
questions as to the form of the indictment were “issues for trial and not for 
this stage.”75 
Third, the court asked when any agreement could have occurred between 
Ulbricht and the alleged coconspirators, whether each coconspirator’s mind 
could have met Ulbricht’s, and whether Ulbricht, by designing the Silk Road, 
made an enduring show of intent to join the conspiracy.76  It answered each 
of these questions by analogy and suggested that by creating and maintaining 
the Silk Road, Ulbricht could have constructed a perpetual offer to join into 
a conspiracy with any future users of the platform.77  According to the court, 
it was as though Ulbricht posted “a sign on a (worldwide) bulletin board that 
said:  ‘I have created an anonymous, untraceable way to traffic narcotics . . . .  
[U]se the platform as much as you would like, provided you pay me a 
percentage of your profits and adhere to my other terms of service.’”78  It 
was therefore possible that each time someone signed up on the site, the sign-
up could function as an acceptance of Ulbricht’s offer, and “as a matter of 
law, he or she may become a coconspirator.”79 
Finally, the court asked whether it was necessary or even possible “to 
pinpoint how the agreement between Ulbricht and his coconspirators was 
made” and whether an agreement could be made by an end user, such as a 
Silk Road seller, interacting with computer software.80  It held that such an 
 
 70. Id. at 556. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 557. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 557–58. 
 78. Id. at 558. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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agreement via software was possible and cited case law holding that an 
agreement within the conspiracy context need not involve words exchanged 
in person, and that all that was necessary was some evidence introduced at 
trial showing that the conspirators “have taken knowing and intentional 
actions to work together in some mutually dependent way to achieve the 
unlawful object.”81 
D.  The Crack House Statute 
Ulbricht was not charged under the crack house statute, but because it 
might apply to the behavior he engaged in, it requires a closer look.  The 
federal crack house statute was enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1986.82  Section 856(a)(1) makes it a crime to “knowingly open, lease, 
rent, use, or maintain any place, whether permanently or temporarily, for the 
purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.”83  
Section 856(a)(2) makes it a crime to 
manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily, either as 
an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly 
and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or 
without compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully 
manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.84 
Section 856(b) provides for punishment—for violating either subsection of 
856(a), “a term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years or a fine of not 
more than $500,000, or both, or a fine of $2,000,000 for a person other than 
an individual.”85 
Importantly, “place” is not currently defined in the statute.  It would 
therefore be helpful to look at the statute’s history for guidance.  The original 
statute was narrower.  Section 856(a)(1), as passed in 1986, only made it a 
crime to “knowingly open or maintain any place for the purpose of 
manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.”86  The Illicit 
Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 200387 supplemented this language and 
replaced “open or maintain any place” with “open, lease, rent, use, or 
maintain any place, whether permanently or temporarily.”88 
Similarly, § 856(a)(2), as passed in 1986, only made it unlawful to 
manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, either as an owner, 
lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally 
rent, lease, or make available for use, with or without compensation, the 
 
 81. Id. at 558–59. 
 82. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 83. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2012). 
 84. Id. § 856(a)(2). 
 85. Id. § 856(b). 
 86. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 § 1841. 
 87. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 88. Id. § 608. 
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building, room, or enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, 
storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.89 
The Illicit Drug Anti–Proliferation Act of 2003 struck much of this language 
and widened the statute’s reach by making it a crime to 
manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily, either as 
an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly 
and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or 
without compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully 
manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.90 
Importantly, the amendment removed the “enclosure” requirement of 
§ 856(a)(2) and replaced the more-specific “building, room, or enclosure”91 
with the current “place” language and criminalized knowingly and 
intentionally “profit[ing] from” such a place.92 
Though sections 856(a)(1) and 856(a)(2) appear to be similar, courts have 
interpreted them as doing different work.  Courts typically construe 
§ 856(a)(1) as requiring a specific intent to knowingly open or maintain any 
place for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled 
substance; that is, to be convicted under § 856(a)(1), the defendant must have 
the specific intent to use the place in order to manufacture, distribute, or use 
a controlled substance.93  On the other hand, courts typically construe 
§ 856(a)(2) as requiring a lesser degree of knowledge or intent on the part of 
 
 89. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 § 1841. 
 90. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2012). 
 91. Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003 § 608. 
 92. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). 
 93. See, e.g., United States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘[I]n the 
residential context, the manufacture (or distribution or use) of drugs must be at least one of 
the primary or principal uses to which the house is put.’ Restricting the application of 
§ 856(a)(1) to those individuals whose manufacture, distribution, or use of drugs in their 
residence constitutes,” the Court stated, “‘one of the primary or principal’ purposes of their 
occupancy of that residence ensures that the statute does not extend beyond its intended 
coverage so as to encompass ‘incidental’ drug use.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296 (10th Cir. 1995))); United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 643 
(6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he definition of ‘purpose’ adopted by the district judge—that the 
government need only prove that the defendant’s drug-related purpose for maintaining a 
premises be ‘significant or important’—is the proper definition of ‘purpose’ in this circuit in 
the context of § 856 prosecutions.”); United States v. Becerra, 97 F.3d 669, 672 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(“To convict a defendant as a principal under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), the government was 
required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) opened or maintained a 
place; (2) for the purpose of distributing or packaging controlled substances; and (3) did so 
knowingly.”); United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296–97 (10th Cir. 1995) (“We agree that 
the ‘crack-house’ statute was designed to punish those who use their property to run drug 
businesses—hence, the more characteristics of a business that are present, the more likely it 
is that the property is being used ‘for the purpose of’ those drug activities prohibited by 
§ 856(a)(1).”); United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that 
a jury instruction accurately set out “the elements of a subsection 856(a)(1) violation, namely, 
that the defendant open or maintain a place with the purpose that drugs be manufactured, 
distributed or used there”); United States v. Mei-Fen Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(“In examining the plain language of the statute, we find that the statute is unambiguous; the 
phrase for the purpose of applies to the person who opens or maintains the place for the illegal 
activity. . . .  [A]ny other interpretation would render § 856(a)(2) essentially superfluous.”). 
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the owner, lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee.94  Section 856(a)(1), then, 
prohibits individuals from maintaining a place for the explicit purpose of 
distributing drugs, while § 856(a)(2) prohibits individuals from maintaining 
a place with the knowledge that it is being used to distribute drugs. 
In practice, the crack house statute is used primarily to prosecute private 
individuals, whether owners or renters, who use their residences to distribute 
controlled substances.95  But the statute has been used in more expansive 
ways as well.  The statute is sometimes used to prosecute owners of 
marijuana dispensaries96 and has been used to prosecute landowners who 
allowed their land to be used for weekend music festivals wherein drug 
activity took place.97  It has been used to prosecute the owner of a car 
dealership who used the company’s property to conduct drug sales.98  It has 
also been used to prosecute the owner of a farm on which marijuana was 
grown.99  Recently, scholars and commentators have raised concerns that the 
statute could be used to prosecute operators and users at “supervised injection 
 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955, 960 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he ‘bare 
meaning’ of the purpose requirement in § 856(a)(2) indicates that the government was not 
required to prove that [defendant] had the intent to manufacture, distribute, or use a controlled 
substance to convict him under the statute.  [Defendant’s] reading of § 856(a)(2) to require 
proof of specific intent to manufacture, distribute or use controlled substances would render it 
redundant with § 856(a)(1).”); United States v. Wilson, 503 F.3d 195, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(“The phrase ‘for the purpose,’ as used in [§ 856(a)(2)], references the purpose and design not 
of the person with the premises, but rather of those who are permitted to engage in drug-related 
activities there.”); United States v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1993) (“In (a)(2) the 
‘purpose’ may be that of others; the defendant is liable if he manages or controls a building 
that others use for an illicit purpose, and he either knows of the illegal activity or remains 
deliberately ignorant of it.”); United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t 
is clear that (a)(1) was intended to apply to deliberate maintenance of a place for a proscribed 
purpose, whereas (a)(2) was intended to prohibit an owner from providing a place for illegal 
conduct, and yet to escape liability on the basis either of lack of illegal purpose, or of deliberate 
ignorance.”); Mei-Fen Chen, 913 F.2d at 190 (holding that “§ 856(a)(2) is designed to apply 
to the person who may not have actually opened or maintained the place for the purpose of 
drug activity, but who has knowingly allowed others to engage in those activities by making 
the place ‘available for use . . . for the purpose of unlawfully’ engaging in such activity” and 
that, “under § 856(a)(2), the person who manages or controls the building and then rents to 
others, need not have the express purpose in doing so that drug related activity take place; 
rather such activity is engaged in by others”). 
 95. A brief Westlaw search of recent cases citing to the statute supports this. See, e.g., 
United States v. O’Brien, 926 F.3d 57, 63–65 (2d Cir. 2019) (residence); United States v. 
Chaney, 921 F.3d 572, 577–78 (6th Cir. 2019) (medical clinic); United States v. Johnson, 768 
F. App’x 920, 921–22 (11th Cir. 2019) (residence); United States v. Congo, No. 2:18-cr-
00193-JDL, 2019 WL 2527090, at *1 (D. Me. June 19, 2019) (residence); United States v. 
Spiva, No. 3:15-cr-169(2), 2019 WL 2330064, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio May 30, 2019) (residence); 
United States v. Davis, No. 5:17-CR-256-1H, 2019 WL 2202890, at *1–2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 9, 
2019) (residence); United States v. Rice, Crim. No. 17-338, 2019 WL 1449744, at *1–3 (W.D. 
Pa. Apr. 2, 2019) (residence). 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1066–68 (9th Cir. 2018); United 
States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 97. Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 957–59. 
 98. Tamez, 941 F.2d at 772–73. 
 99. United States v. Molina-Perez, 595 F.3d 854, 858–59 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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facilities,”100 a harm reduction approach to the nation’s ongoing opioid 
crisis.101  Neither § 856(a)(1) nor § 856(a)(2) have yet been used to prosecute 
owners of online spaces, such as the operators or creators of dark net drug 
marketplaces. 
II.  USING CONSPIRACY LAW TO PROSECUTE TYPICAL DARK NET DRUG 
MARKETPLACE OPERATORS 
Having laid out the bare bones of conspiracy law in the context of narcotics 
laws,102 this Part will first briefly walk through the typical dark net drug 
marketplace103 and then will take a closer look at the challenges of using 
conspiracy law to prosecute the operators of these marketplaces.104  It will 
ask whether conspiracy law, for a number of reasons, might make for a poor 
conceptual fit in the prosecution of these operators.  It will suggest that such 
a poor fit could pose problems to the criminal justice system, especially 
where a “better” statute might exist. 
A.  The Typical Dark Net Drug Marketplace 
Dark net drug marketplaces are characterized in large part by the 
anonymity they provide their users, buyers and sellers alike.105  While a wide 
variety of products are available on these marketplaces, drugs are the main 
products bought and sold.106  Because users are essentially anonymous, these 
markets rely heavily on trust, typically built on feedback systems like user 
reviews.107  Dark net drug marketplaces are far less hierarchical than normal 
 
 100. See generally, e.g., Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local 
Innovation in Public Health:  The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1089 (2009); Alex Kreit, Safe Injection Sites and the Federal “Crack House” Statute, 60 
B.C. L. REV. 413 (2019); Amber A. Leary, Note, A Safe Harbor in the Opioid Crisis:  How 
the Federal Government Should Allow States to Legislate for Safe Injection Facilities in Light 
of the Opioid Public Health Emergency, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 635 (2019); Cylas Martell-
Crawford, Note, Safe Injection Facilities:  A Path to Legitimacy, 11 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 124 
(2017); Melissa Vallejo, Note, Safer Bathrooms in Syringe Exchange Programs:  Injecting 
Progress into the Harm Reduction Movement, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1185 (2018). 
 101. German Lopez, Why Some U.S. Cities Are Opening Safe Spaces for Injecting Heroin, 
VOX (Feb. 6, 2019, 4:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/1/25/16928144/ 
safe-injection-sites-heroin-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/D857-SRR2]. 
 102. See supra Part I.B. 
 103. See infra Part II.A. 
 104. See infra Part II.B. 
 105. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 107. See, e.g., Robert Augustus Hardy & Julia R. Norgaard, Reputation in the Internet 
Black Market:  An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis of the Deep Web, 12 J. INSTITUTIONAL 
ECON. 515, 520 (2015) (“The codification of buyer and seller feedback makes up each party’s 
user profile.  A user’s feedback profile in this marketplace is made up of the comments and 
ratings left on the Silk Road site as well as other feedback forums. . . .  The collection of this 
user feedback on other users makes up the reputation of the trader in the marketplace. . . .  
Potential buyers utilize this feedback about sellers.  They can read comments about previous 
buyer’s experiences, whether or not the buyer received the items, and view the seller’s 30-day 
and 60-day and overall rating score.” (citation omitted)); Yasmine Hassan, The Illicit Drug 
Trade on the Dark Net:  Analysing the Need for a New EU Framework (2017) (unpublished 
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marketplaces.108  Most drug transactions that take place through dark net 
drug marketplaces are purchases of small quantities of drugs for personal use, 
but a significant amount of purchases are made for distribution quantities as 
well.109 
Although marketplaces differ on whom they cater to, who operates them, 
how much commission they charge, where they are located, and what internal 
rules govern them, most will be similar in a few ways.  Dark net drug 
marketplaces are typically created and maintained by a single person or a 
small staff.110  These marketplaces primarily serve as a way to connect 
buyers and sellers; marketplace operators themselves are not selling or 
buying drugs.111  The operators of these marketplaces are typically 
compensated by a small commission from every transaction that occurs.112  
The design of these marketplaces offers significant anonymity to operators, 
 
master’s thesis, Universiteit Leiden) (on file with author) (“Thirdly, and maybe the most 
important characteristic concerns the high level of anonymity these cryptomarkets offer to 
their vendors and customers. . . .  [T]rustworthiness is key in these cases and this is embodied 
in the significant role feedback systems play on cryptomarkets.”); Toms Reksna, Complex 
Network Analysis of Darknet Black Market Forum Structure (Sept. 18, 2017) (unpublished 
M.Sc. thesis, Universiteit Leiden) (on file with author). 
 108. Julia R. Norgaard, Harold J. Walbert & Robert Augustus Hardy, Shadow Markets and 
Hierarchies:  Comparing and Modeling Networks in the Dark Net, 14 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 
877, 894–95 (2018). 
 109. See, e.g., KRISTY KRUITHOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 101 (“Only 2 per cent of 
transactions analysed in this study exceeded $1,000, a majority of which we conclude were 
likely to be wholesale purchases.  This small share of wholesale transactions, however, did 
generate about a quarter of the total drugs revenues on the markets analysed.  The lion’s share 
of transactions on these cryptomarkets was generated by listings under $100, most likely to be 
for personal use.  But these retail transactions generated only 18 per cent of total revenues.  
Most revenues were generated by listings priced between $100 and $500 (41 per cent).”); 
Christin, supra note 26, at 25 (“[W]hile vendors on these marketplaces primarily cater in the 
retail space, with individual item weights and volumes frequently corresponding to personal 
amounts, there is evidence of much larger (bulk-like) sales.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Joshuah Bearman, The Untold Story of Silk Road, Part 1, WIRED (May 
2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1/ [https://perma.cc/Y2LF-M7MA] (Silk 
Road); Andrea Bellemare, The Secret Life of Alexandre Cazes, Alleged Dark Web 
Mastermind, CBC NEWS (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/ 
alexandre-cazes-millionaire-cars-property-alphabay-1.4215894 [https://perma.cc/YQ35-
MN3L] (AlphaBay); Joseph Cox, The Secret Life of a Silk Road 2.0 Mastermind, VICE:  
MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 10, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
3dad83/the-secret-life-of-a-silk-road-20-mastermind [https://perma.cc/HK89-GJXQ] (Silk 
Road 2.0); Details Emerge of the German Administrators of Hansa Market on the Darknet, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (July 22, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/details-emerge-of-the-german-
administrators-of-hansa-market-on-the-darknet/a-39804272 [https://perma.cc/6D2D-S5TX] 
(Hansa). 
 111. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 112. See, e.g., Anick Jesdanun, AlphaBay:  How Dark Web Marketplaces Operate Like 
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Site Silk Road, USA TODAY (May 15, 2014, 2:54 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2013/10/21/fbi-cracks-silk-road/2984921/ [https://perma.cc/5TQP-U3B6] 
(“The FBI estimates that Silk Road’s operator made $80 million in commissions from the 
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buyers, and sellers because they are accessible only through browsers like 
Tor and using payment methods like Bitcoin that do not require conventional 
banking.113  Buyers can leave feedback on sellers,114 but buyer-buyer 
communication, seller-seller communication, and buyer-seller 
communication outside of transactions are rare, as is communication between 
the operator and any user.115  The buyers’ goal is typically to obtain drugs 
for personal use or for resale; the sellers’ goal is typically monetary gain; and 
the operators’ goal is typically to earn commission through transactions that 
take place on the marketplace, the vast majority of which are drug sales.116 
B.  Critiques of Charging the Typical Dark Net Drug Marketplace Operator 
with Conspiracy to Distribute Narcotics 
This subsection will detail a variety of reasons why the conspiracy to 
distribute narcotics charge may not be a good fit for prosecuting the operator 
of the typical dark net drug marketplace described above.  The first potential 
problem with the conspiracy charge is that the relationships between the 
alleged conspirators will typically resemble not a single conspiracy, as was 
alleged in the Ulbricht case, but a “rimless hub-and-spoke conspiracy,” 
which under U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence will consist of many different 
conspiracies rather than a single one.117  Second, it is unclear whether users 
of the marketplace know about or intend to join the other users in a wide-
ranging, single conspiracy.118  Third, there exists what this Note will term 
the “eBay problem,” which is that distinguishing dark net drug marketplaces 
from legitimate marketplaces, while seemingly easy at first glance, becomes 
a difficult problem as the facts change.119  Finally, the public policy goals 
that justify the conspiracy charge are not as apparent as applied to dark net 
drug marketplace cases.120 
1.  The “Rimless Hub-and-Spoke” Problem 
In Kotteakos v. United States,121 the Supreme Court considered the case of 
three defendants convicted of fraudulently obtaining loans under the National 
Housing Act.122  Brown, who pleaded guilty and was not a party to this case, 
was the central figure in the fraudulent scheme and provided fraudulent loans 
under the Act for others.123  The defendants knowingly submitted fraudulent 
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loan applications prepared by Brown and were indicted for a single 
conspiracy amongst themselves, Brown, and twenty-eight other people.124  
On appeal, the Kotteakos defendants challenged the discrepancy between 
what was alleged in the indictment, a single conspiracy, and what they argued 
the government proved at trial, separate conspiracies between Brown and 
each of the individuals he prepared fraudulent loans applications for.125 
The Supreme Court held that this discrepancy was fatal to the indictment, 
reversed the convictions, and remanded for further proceedings.126  The 
government stated that the relationship between Brown and the others in the 
conspiracy was “that of separate spokes meeting in a common center,”127 to 
which the Court added, “without the rim of the wheel to enclose the 
spokes.”128  In considering the relationships between Brown and the 
defendants in light of the conspiracy statute they were charged under, the 
Court stated that it did not think that “Congress . . . intended to authorize the 
Government to string together, for common trial, eight or more separate and 
distinct crimes, conspiracies related in kind though they might be, when the 
only nexus among them lies in the fact that one man participated in all.”129 
The parallels between the relationships between Brown and the Kotteakos 
defendants and dark net drug operators and their users are compelling.  
Brown acted as a central figure in the loan scheme and prepared the 
fraudulent loans for the other persons listed in the indictment.  Drug 
marketplace operators, like Ulbricht, are the central figures in the typical 
marketplace, often creating the website and maintaining it.130  Brown took a 
5 percent commission,131 similar to the commissions taken by the operators 
of these marketplaces.132  Little connected the non-Brown members of the 
Kotteakos conspiracy to each other; little connects the assorted dealers on the 
typical dark net drug marketplace aside from their shared online location.  In 
short, the relationship between the typical dark net drug marketplace 
operators and their users closely resembles the “rimless” hub-and-spoke 
structure that the Kotteakos Court condemned—many individual operator-
user relationships but little connecting the individual users together to 
suggest a single, all-encompassing conspiracy. 
In United States v. Ulbricht,133 the court stated in its denial of the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment that “[o]f course, ultimately, 
the form of the conspiracy is not as important as a determination that at least 
one other person joined in the alleged conspiratorial agreement with 
Ulbricht.”134  Additionally, it found that this “multiple conspiracy” issue did 
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not prejudice the defendant where he, the “hub” of the conspiracy, was the 
sole defendant.135  While the Kotteakos Court was concerned in part with the 
prejudice suffered by “non-hub” coconspirators like the defendants in that 
case,136 and not “hub” conspirators like Brown, prosecutors invite risk by 
alleging a thousand-person conspiracy in the typical marketplace case, as the 
prosecution in the Ulbricht case did.137 
2.  The “Agreement” Element 
The court’s opinion in Ulbricht is similarly instructive in teasing out issues 
concerning the temporal scope of the typical dark net drug marketplace 
conspiracy.  In denying the motion to dismiss the indictment, the court stated 
that it was possible that Ulbricht, by designing and operating the Silk Road, 
effectively posted a sign on a worldwide bulletin board, which advertised an 
anonymous, untraceable way to traffic narcotics.138  As a matter of law, the 
court ruled, it is possible that each user of the website became a coconspirator 
at the moment he or she used the website.139  Citing United States v. 
Borelli,140 the court stated that courts have long recognized that members of 
a conspiracy may join the conspiracy at different times.141 
This question of temporal proximity concerns all typical dark net drug 
marketplaces, which are created first by a single person or small group of 
people and then are later joined by users.142  But while the bulletin board in 
Ulbricht might suffice to join a later user to an operator, it fails to join later 
users to both prior users and later users—that is, even taken as a given that 
the typical drug seller on a dark net drug marketplace joins into a conspiracy 
with the operator at the moment the seller joins the site, nothing would seem 
to bind him or her to other users.  There is reciprocity in the operator-seller 
relationship that lends itself to a conspiratorial understanding.  Operators 
provide the anonymous platforms on which the untraceable transactions may 
occur, and buyers and sellers pay commission for the use of the platform.  No 
such reciprocity exists at the seller-seller level. 
This problem is closely related to the “rimless hub-and-spoke” problem143 
but compounded by the “pre-programmed,” asynchronous nature of the 
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agreement posited by the court in Ulbricht.144  The hypothetical agreement 
is made in two pieces:  first by the operator at the creation of the marketplace 
and his continued maintenance of it, and then by the user at the moment of 
his or her use of the marketplace.145  Such an agreement is premised at least 
in part on the reciprocal benefits each party earns, but no such reciprocity 
exists between the different sellers on the site.  The Ulbricht indictment 
alleged a conspiracy including Ulbricht and thousands of other dealers146—
each seller on the site, then, must be proved to have intended to join such a 
conspiracy.  While the bulletin board metaphor makes sense in the operator-
seller relationship, it fails to establish a cognizable basis for the thousands of 
seller-seller relationships that the single conspiracy formation requires. 
3.  The “eBay Problem” 
One problem inherent in the prosecution of dark net drug marketplace 
operators with the conspiracy charge is that typical drug marketplaces share 
a bevy of similarities with legitimate online marketplaces like eBay.  eBay, 
like many dark net drug marketplaces, is an online marketplace on which 
buyers and vendors may buy or sell almost anything.147  Both platforms 
charge commissions.148  And both have a relatively nonhierarchical shape 
and are owned and operated by a person or group much smaller than their 
vast user populations.149  A charge that prohibits the operation of an online 
drug marketplace while posing no threat to operators of legitimate 
marketplaces thus becomes very desirable. 
It is instructive to illustrate what differentiates the two.  Typical dark net 
drug marketplaces are found on the dark net, accessible only through 
software that provides a high level of anonymity, whereas eBay is located on 
the surface web, accessible by anyone with an internet connection.150  The 
majority of products found on the typical dark net drug marketplace are 
controlled substances, whereas eBay features only a small amount of illicit 
sales, which are prohibited and policed.151  Dark net drug marketplaces offer 
even greater anonymity through the use of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, 
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whereas eBay accepts only legal tender.152  Finally, the operator of a typical 
dark net drug marketplace intends to use his or her marketplace as a space 
for drug transactions, while legitimate marketplaces like eBay presumably 
intend to turn a profit and conform with the laws and regulations that apply 
to them.  The first three differences—the anonymity provided by the dark 
net, the products bought and sold on the market, and the payment methods 
accepted—are mostly differences in degree, not kind. The fourth—the intent 
behind the operator’s design and maintenance of the market—is what truly 
differentiates legitimate marketplaces like eBay from illegitimate ones.  The 
final difference-in-kind will offer useful insight as to how law enforcement 
might approach marketplace-level enforcement through the crack house 
statute. 
First, dark net drug marketplaces, through their design and their location 
on the dark net, offer a high level of anonymity to their users.153  That said, 
the anonymity is not absolute.  Law enforcement is sometimes able to use 
conventional investigative techniques to identify buyers, sellers, and 
operators of such marketplaces.154  Ross Ulbricht, for example, was 
identified in part by a Silk Road administrator’s cooperation with federal 
authorities after they had learned the administrator’s identity.155  Servers for 
such marketplaces exist in the real world and, should they be discovered, law 
enforcement may be able to identify people who have connected with the 
server.156  Similarly, while legitimate marketplaces like eBay offer little 
anonymity to users, they do not offer complete transparency.  eBay users, 
like dark net users, use personalized usernames.157  Users do not have to use 
their full name as their eBay ID.158  For most purposes, eBay sellers are 
“anonymous” in that a casual browser would not be able to determine the 
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identities of buyers or sellers.  Law enforcement typically has to issue a 
subpoena to access the information eBay has stored on individual 
accounts.159  The level of anonymity the dark net provides—strong, but not 
total—is higher than legitimate websites like eBay, which provide weak, but 
not zero, anonymity to users. 
Second, while the majority of transactions on dark net drug marketplaces 
are drug sales,160 some legitimate transactions do occur.  For example, the 
popular marketplace AlphaBay hosted primarily digital goods and non-
narcotics sales prior to the takedown of other dark net drug marketplaces.161  
Even marketplaces like the Silk Road, while primarily used for drug 
transactions, hosted a large number of legitimate transactions.162  Legitimate 
marketplaces like eBay and Amazon, on the other hand, are no strangers to 
illicit transactions.163  While illicit transactions on legitimate marketplaces 
may be the exception rather than the rule, it is beyond argument that they can 
and have occurred.  The majority of transactions on dark net drug 
marketplaces involve narcotics, but legitimate transactions can and do occur. 
Third, dark net drug marketplaces generally only accept cryptocurrencies 
like Bitcoin.164  Cryptocurrencies enhance the anonymity these platforms 
provide, as they are not tied to traditional financial structures like banks, 
whose records can be subpoenaed by law enforcement.165  While 
cryptocurrencies do typically grant a higher level of anonymity than 
traditional payment methods, they are not absolutely untraceable.  The nature 
of the technology behind cryptocurrencies means that a single Bitcoin, for 
instance, can be tracked through the blockchain over time.166  Additionally, 
the anonymity provided by cryptocurrencies is only as strong as their holder’s 
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password, or “private key.”167  Should that password be compromised, the 
security and anonymity granted by the cryptocurrency is similarly 
compromised.168  eBay, on the other hand, does not yet take cryptocurrency, 
like Bitcoin, as a payment.169  That said, eBay is contemplating adopting 
Bitcoin as a valid payment method,170 and across platforms there has been 
an explosion in interest in permitting cryptocurrencies to be used as valid 
forms of payment.171 
Aside from these differences in degree, the fourth difference between dark 
net drug marketplaces is one in kind—the operator’s intent.  While the 
operators and owners of legitimate marketplaces intend to operate within the 
boundaries of applicable laws and regulations, the intent behind most dark 
net drug marketplaces is to operate a space for distribution of drugs.172  The 
Ulbricht indictment, for example, alleged such an intent,173 and the court’s 
opinion denying the motion to dismiss the indictment described why the 
intent element was so important.174  It is plausible that such an intent can be 
shown by the volume of drug sales on most dark net marketplaces and the 
commissions their operators are earning.  The guidelines and policies that 
legitimate marketplaces typically put in place to prevent illicit transactions 
bolster this distinction.175  Dark net drug marketplaces, as evidenced by the 
sheer volume of drug transactions they host,176 obviously have no such 
policies or interest in enforcing them.  This intent difference, then, offers the 
only real categorical distinction between the typical legitimate marketplace 
like eBay and the typical dark net drug marketplaces like the Silk Road, 
Hansa, or AlphaBay.  A charge for which intent is at the forefront, then, may 
be preferable to one like conspiracy, which requires jurors to find intent 
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amongst a host of other elements like agreement, illegal objective, the span 
and scope of the alleged conspiracy, and how many conspiracies in fact exist. 
4.  The Policy Goals of the Standalone Conspiracy Law May Not Apply 
Finally, the policy reasons for a standalone conspiracy charge do not apply 
as forcefully in the dark net drug marketplace context as they do in the typical 
hierarchical narcotics conspiracy.  The chief reason for the standalone 
conspiracy charge is that conspiracies pose greater dangers to the public than 
would be possible if individual actors simply acted alone.177  This is true in 
the typical complex narcotics conspiracy, which might include a person who 
creates a controlled substance in a laboratory, who then delivers the pure 
product to a few wholesalers, who then distribute a diluted product to street 
sellers, who then employ lookouts and middlemen—and a money launderer 
cleans the proceeds for various members.  Each actor serves as a cog in the 
larger hierarchy, and each role is indispensable to the organization and 
furthers the end goal of narcotics distribution.178 
The typical dark net drug marketplace is much less hierarchical,179 and 
therefore the group danger element, which society seeks to deter through a 
standalone conspiracy charge, loses much of its force.  The hierarchy in the 
typical marketplace consists of an operator who creates and maintains the 
site, with sellers and buyers transacting with each other on the platform and 
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paying a commission to the operator.180  Some staff or administrators may 
help the normal function of the marketplace, but the structure of the 
“conspiracy” includes only the party providing the platform, the party using 
the platform to sell, and the party using the platform to purchase. 
Despite being less hierarchical, dark net drug marketplaces do pose unique 
dangers.  While the conspiracy’s special danger is its ability to compound 
harm via multiple, coordinating actors,181 the dark net drug marketplace’s 
special danger is its nature as a near-anonymous place where users across the 
world can buy and sell controlled substances.182  The special danger of the 
conspiracy is addressed by the advantages that the conspiracy charge carries 
with it.183  The advantages of the conspiracy charge are aimed towards that 
particular danger, and its use becomes less justifiable in the case of the typical 
dark net drug marketplace operator, whose most culpable behavior is creating 
a near-anonymous, wide-reaching platform mostly outside of the reach of 
law enforcement. 
Another reason for the standalone conspiracy charge is the secrecy that 
conspiracies naturally cloak themselves in.184  But here, too, the force of the 
policy is weaker in the typical dark net drug marketplace than in the typical 
narcotics conspiracy.  Dark net drug marketplaces operate openly online—a 
simple Google search turns up a list of markets, and tutorials as to how to 
access those markets are available freely as well.185  The anonymity provided 
by the dark net is a function of the design of Tor-like browsers and difficult-
to-trace currencies like Bitcoin,186 neither of which are illegal on their own.  
There is nothing inherently secretive in the marketplace-seller-buyer 
relationship. 
III.  THE “CRACK HOUSE” STATUTE—TAILORED FOR ONLINE DRUG 
MARKETS 
21 U.S.C. § 856 criminalizes the type of behavior operators of dark net 
drug marketplaces engage in.  This Part will argue that a plain reading of the 
statute permits the prosecution of such operators through the statute, 
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sometimes termed the “crack house” statute.187  In doing so it will examine 
the word “place,” argue that the statute’s legislative history leaves open the 
possibility of its use in prosecuting such operators,188 suggest that law 
enforcement is in need of tools to reduce the availability of controlled 
substances given the current opioid crisis,189 answer why such a novel 
approach is preferable to the conspiracy charge, and finally conclude by 
addressing likely counterarguments. 
While the crack house statute’s use in this context is novel, there is a 
history of tension between technological advances and statutory law.  
Scholars have long argued that instead of waiting for legislatures to revise 
laws upon every new technological advance, courts should allow for statutes 
to cover situations that may not have been contemplated by their drafters due 
to advances in technology.190  Criminal statutes have been employed to 
address new technologies in a variety of ways throughout history.191  Though 
a prosecution of a dark net drug marketplace operator with the crack house 
statute would be the first prosecution of its kind, it would continue a long line 
of similar statutes adapting to modern use. 
A.  A Realistic Solution 
The problems with charging the typical dark net drug marketplace operator 
with a single conspiracy encompassing all of the users of his or her site can 
be summarized as follows:  (1) the structure alleged, instead of forming a 
single conspiracy, actually forms a rimless hub-and-spoke structure which 
creates not a single conspiracy but many separate operator-seller-buyer 
conspiracies;192 (2) given the rimless hub-and-spoke structure that fails to tie 
users together, there are serious issues concerning the conspiracy each user 
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is agreeing to, especially considering the “automated agreement” 
contemplated by the Ulbricht court;193 (3) the public policy purposes for the 
standalone conspiracy charge do not apply as forcefully to the online drug 
marketplace as they would to a typical narcotics conspiracy;194 and (4) the 
operator’s intent is the main thing separating the typical dark net drug 
marketplace operator from the operator or director of a legitimate online 
marketplace like eBay or Amazon.195 
While the conspiracy charge is a poor conceptual fit for the behavior 
engaged in by the typical dark net drug marketplace operator, prosecutors 
should be encouraged to charge that behavior under laws that do proscribe it.  
A statute explicitly prohibiting this behavior would be ideal, such as a statute 
that criminalizes the creation and operation of a website which is designed as 
a safe haven for drug dealers and purchasers.  Such a statute would avoid 
most of the difficulties specific to the conspiracy charge discussed above.  
Rimless hub-and-spoke issues wash away where no proof of conspiracy is 
needed.  Any agreements the alleged members of the conspiracy may or may 
not have made would be irrelevant, as would be the temporal proximity of 
those agreements; only the conduct and intent of the operator would matter.  
Any concerns about the conspiracy charge’s public policy goals not being 
met in the dark net context would fade away where a standalone conspiracy 
charge is not used.  While the eBay problem is endemic to any sort of criminal 
prosecution of an operator of an online marketplace, because the main 
difference between legitimate and illegitimate marketplaces is the intent of 
the operator, the hypothetical statute would place intent at the forefront of the 
charge.  That intent, instead of being tangled up in the knowledge, agreement, 
objective, and overt act elements of the conspiracy charge, would become 
nearly the only factual issue jurors must resolve. 
B.  A Plain Text Reading Permits Prosecutions of This Type 
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) makes it a crime to “knowingly . . . maintain any 
place, whether permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of . . . 
distributing . . . any controlled substance,” while 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) 
makes it a crime to “manage or control any place . . . and knowingly and 
intentionally . . . profit from . . . the place for the purpose of unlawfully . . . 
distributing . . . a controlled substance.”196  The text, on its face, appears to 
prohibit the type of conduct that the typical dark net drug marketplace 
operator engages in so long as an internet platform qualifies as a “place.”  
Either subsection could apply to the conduct of the typical dark net drug 
marketplace operator.  The first, which courts have interpreted to require the 
intent to distribute a controlled substance,197 could apply to operators who, 
through their creation and maintenance of the marketplace, fully intend it to 
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facilitate the distribution of controlled substances, as was alleged in the 
Ulbricht indictment.198  The second, which courts have interpreted to require 
a lesser showing of intent—generally that the defendant intended to make the 
place available while knowing that distribution of controlled substances 
occurred therein199—could be charged where issues of fact exist as to the 
operator’s intent. 
The main issue in using the crack house statute to charge the operators of 
dark net drug marketplaces is that the statute prohibits only maintaining a 
“place,” without defining what a “place” is.200  There are no reported cases 
in which prosecutors charged that the maintenance or creation of an online 
place was in violation of the statute.  Merriam-Webster defines “place” as a 
“physical environment; a way for admission or transit; physical 
surroundings; an indefinite region; a particular region, center of population, 
or location,” among others.201  Referring to online locations as “places” is 
not unheard of in popular culture.202  Absent a conclusive indication based 
on its plain meaning, other areas of law can perhaps be useful to analyze 
whether “place” should extend to online platforms. 
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act203 (ADA) prohibits 
discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of 
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of 
any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or 
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”204  The First, 
Second, and Seventh Circuits have left open the possibility of extending the 
definition of “place” in the ADA to online platforms.205  Several courts, 
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however, have held that the ADA speaks only to physical locations or that 
for a nonphysical place to be covered under the ADA, there needs to be some 
nexus between the nonphysical place and a physical one.206  Scholars 
concerned with the ADA’s applicability to online places have argued for its 
applicability,207 against its applicability,208 or commented on the confused 
state of courts in this realm, arguing instead for executive branch guidance.209 
A more problematic issue in applying the crack house statute to online 
places concerns the heading of 21 U.S.C. § 856, “Maintaining Drug-Involved 
Premises.”210  The word “premises,” as compared to the ambiguous “place,” 
denotes more strongly a physical location.  Merriam-Webster defines 
premises as “a tract of land with the buildings thereon; a building or part of 
a building usually with its appurtenances (such as grounds).”211  The 
Cambridge Dictionary defines premises as “a house or other building and the 
land on which it is built.”212  Courts may use statutory titles and section 
headings in interpreting the meaning of statutes.213  However, using titles and 
headings to interpret a statute will usually only be permissible when the text 
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of the statute itself is ambiguous.214  Based on the arguments discussed 
above, the word “place” is not necessarily ambiguous and can support a broad 
definition extending to nonphysical locations without necessitating analysis 
of the statute’s title. 
Assuming that “place” can apply to online platforms, applying the crack 
house statute to dark net drug marketplace operators becomes somewhat 
straightforward.  First the prosecution would have to show that the operator 
“maintained” the place—in subsection (a)(1) cases, the prosecution could 
even show the operator “opened” the place.  In crack house statute 
prosecutions, maintenance might be shown in a variety of ways, including 
through possession of the place, dominion or control over the place, 
protecting the place, and making repairs to the place.215  The typical dark net 
drug marketplace operator designs the website, acts as administrator, reaps 
the commissions for transactions that occur on the website, and might make 
repairs to the code of the website—all of which would clearly evidence 
maintenance.  Second, the prosecution would have to show purpose.  In 
subsection (a)(1) cases, the prosecution would have to show that the 
operator’s purpose was the distribution of drugs.216  In subsection (a)(2) 
cases, the prosecution would have to show that the users of the marketplace 
had the purpose of distributing controlled substances and that the operator 
was aware of such distribution or acted deliberately ignorant of such 
distribution.217  Proving such a purpose would likely be easy in most 
subsection (a)(2) cases—especially if the vast majority of the transactions 
were drug transactions.218  While more difficult in subsection (a)(1) cases, 
proving such a purpose could be done where the facts are strong, such as in 
the Ulbricht case.219 
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C.  Why Push for This Reading At All? 
Given successful narcotics conspiracy prosecutions,220 why push for the 
crack house statute as a prosecutorial tool in dark net drug marketplace cases 
at all?  Three reasons advise it:  first, as compared with conspiracy law, the 
crack house statute provides a better conceptual fit for the typical dark net 
drug marketplace operator’s actions; second, the crack house charge avoids 
the unique prejudices suffered by the defendant in the typical dark net drug 
marketplace case; and third, the ongoing overdose crisis in America demands 
creative prosecutorial tools in the absence of the strong facts necessary to 
charge a narcotics conspiracy in these cases. 
First, for a variety of reasons, the conspiracy to distribute narcotics charge 
is a poor fit in the case of the typical dark net drug marketplace operator.221  
In short, the difficulties are that:  (1) the typical marketplace structure creates 
individual conspiracies between the operator and each of the sellers rather 
than a single conspiracy encompassing the operators and every seller on the 
site;222 (2) issues exist at the individual seller level as to what conspiracy they 
knowingly and intentionally join;223 (3) the only categorical difference 
between dark net drug marketplaces and legitimate online marketplaces is 
the intent of the operator/management team;224 and (4) the public policy 
objectives for the standalone conspiracy charge are not as salient in the dark 
net drug marketplace operator case.225 
Alleging a single, all-encompassing conspiracy in the typical dark net drug 
marketplace operator case, where no conspiracies or multiple operator-seller 
conspiracies exist, poses unique prejudices to the operator, generally due to 
the sheer number of coconspirators alleged.226  First, the typical operator 
likely suffers prejudice when he or she is alleged to have masterminded a 
large, thousand-person conspiracy, and this prejudice is especially acute 
when the prosecution fails to introduce evidence as to each operator-seller 
relationship at trial.  Second, large, complex trials pose issues for juries, court 
resources, and defendants.227  While only a single operator faces trial in the 
typical dark net drug marketplace case, complexity issues remain concerning 
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the evidence necessary to prove each conspiracy and the number of 
individual relationships.  Third, the doctrine of the crime of conspiracy 
naturally tends to grow,228 so experimental and tangential uses of the 
conspiracy charge should be carefully guarded against, employed only when 
the public interest goals of the standalone conspiracy charge are most 
salient.229 
Finally, although the conspiracy charge is ill-fit for the typical dark net 
drug marketplace operator, the crack house charge can serve as an excellent 
replacement tool, especially at a time when the opioid epidemic demands 
effective intervention by law enforcement.  Overdose deaths have risen to a 
zenith in recent years, and though the crisis has shown signs of leveling off, 
the number of overdose deaths is still unacceptably high.230  While it is 
beyond the scope of this Note to argue that the dark net is a cause of the 
overdose epidemic, the sheer volume of drug transactions that occur on dark 
net drug marketplaces, along with the large revenues that operators are 
earning, suggests that these marketplaces are a contributing source.  At the 
individual level, dark net drug marketplace transactions have resulted in 
overdose deaths.231 
D.  Addressing Counterarguments 
This use of the crack house statute is novel and, admittedly, there may be 
one or more good reasons for this novelty.  This section addresses some 
arguments against using the crack house statute in this manner, and 
ultimately argues that despite them, the crack house statute is a better 
prosecutorial fit than conspiracy law.  The arguments against using the statute 
in this manner can be approximated as:  first, the language of the statute, as 
evidenced by the statute’s legislative history, cannot sanction this use; 
second, the rule of lenity prohibits this type of expansive reading of the 
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statute; finally, given successful prosecutions under conspiracy law and other 
charges, this novel reading of the crack house statute is unnecessary. 
The crack house statute’s legislative history suggests that it was not 
intended to cover dark net drug marketplaces.  The statute was enacted in 
1986,232 several years before the creation of the World Wide Web and far 
before the concept of a dark web drug marketplace was fathomable.233  The 
statute was amended in 2003, and while the amendment expanded the statute 
to include the now-existing “place” language,234 the purpose of the 
amendment was at least partly to provide for prosecutions of drug activity at 
outdoor “rave” parties.235  The history of the statute, then, may imply that 
internet locations should not be covered by “place,” an assertion bolstered by 
the fact that the heading of 21 U.S.C. § 856 is “Maintaining Drug-Involved 
Premises,” which more strongly denotes a physical location.  This argument, 
while persuasive, is ultimately weaker than the simple plain text of the 
statute.  A “place” can mean many different locations other than physical 
spaces, as evidenced by both the word’s common use and its dictionary 
definition.236 
The rule of lenity might also prohibit this kind of expansive reading of the 
crack house statute.  The rule of lenity237—serving the goals of providing 
notice to the public,238 guaranteeing that courts do not sanction overbroad 
readings of statutes,239 and enhancing the transparency and accountability of 
criminal justice240—circumscribes experimental uses of statutes.  This 
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argument, while similarly persuasive, is rebutted by the fact that the rule of 
lenity may only apply when a statute is ambiguous.241  While the word 
“place” is broad, it is not necessarily ambiguous, and its common use 
suggests that it is often used to refer to internet locations.242  The statute’s 
more restrictive 1986 text was amended to cover more “places” rather than 
just buildings.243  While the rule of lenity serves to give prosecutors pause 
before experimental uses of statutes, it does not bar them completely if the 
statute is unambiguous. 
Finally, one might ask why it is advisable to stretch the statute in this 
manner at all.  Part III.C addressed this question in part,244 but there are a 
bevy of other solutions available to the federal prosecutor as well.  Ulbricht, 
for example, was convicted not only of conspiracy to distribute narcotics but 
of six other crimes.245  While a conspiracy to distribute narcotics might not 
be the best-fitting charge in a dark net drug marketplace case, why would a 
prosecutor go out of his or her way to be the first to charge a crack house 
violation?  The answer lies in the fact that the statute perfectly proscribes the 
type of behavior that the operator engages in.  The culpability of the operator 
is not that of a buyer, not that of a seller, and not that of a “runner” that brings 
drugs from the seller to the buyer.  It is the culpability of the person who 
makes large-scale drug operations possible while profiting from them as 
well.  This is exactly the type of activity that the crack house statute 
penalizes.  The typical dark net drug marketplace operator, through his 
expertise, experience, and criminal intent, makes possible a bazaar of drug 
dealing—not as a “cog” in a larger “machine” conspiracy, but as the person 
who provides that machine a clandestine space from which to operate, all 
while charging rent.  The operator’s behavior is nearly identical to the person 
the crack house statute was written to address—someone who is not directly 
involved in dealing drugs him or herself but who instead maintains a 
residence, business, venue, or place for the purpose of the distribution of 
drugs.  This deserves its own crime—a crime codified at 21 U.S.C. § 856. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Note is not to soften the treatment of operators of dark 
net drug marketplaces.  While proponents of such places laud them as the 
ultimate free market platform,246 the drug trade they enable inevitably leads 
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to death, either in the form of overdoses247 or violence.248  Instead, this Note 
argues that the criminal charge must fit the behavior.  The conspiracy to 
distribute narcotics charge is a poor fit.  The crack house charge is a better 
fit.  While the statute is potentially ambiguous, it is a valid law enforcement 
tool.  Should expanding the statute in this way be too experimental for courts, 
the statute should be amended, as it was in 2003, to cover the new digital 
frontier of drug dealing.  Technological advances allow for evolution in 
criminal enterprise—law enforcement must be allowed to evolve alongside 
them. 
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